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The practice of prenatal diagno-
sis raises a number of serious ethi -
cal dilemmas. I sha ll focus here on 
one of these : the selective abortion 
of defective fetuses. Selective abor-
tion is commonly recognized as the 
ce ntral ethica l dilemma in prenata l 
diagnosis, and it receives new ur-
gency in light of the recen t deci -
sions on abortio n by the Uni ted 
States Supreme Court. 
T he questions being raised here 
are first, wha t justi fications are of-
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fered for prenatal diagnosis and 
selective abortion; and second, 
what are the implications of the 
ethical reasoning embodied in 
these justifications? I shall argue 
that the current and projected 
widescale practice of prenatal di ag-
nosis and selective abortion estab-
lishes precedents which both vio-
late fundamental principles of 
just ice and threaten the traditiona l 
life-preserving orientation o f med-
icine . 
It may be helpful first to set the 
entire discussion in the context of 
two important trends in our chang-
ing social ethos. Both these trends 
have achieved sharp articulation 
during the time of development 
of prenatal diagnos is, and both 
have influenced arguments made 
on behalf of prenata l diagnosis and 
selective abortion. 
The first trend encompasses a 
general awareness of " women's 
rights" and specifically, a move-
ment toward autonomy of women 
in the reproductive sphere. This 
trend received significant articula-
tion in the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Griswold v. Connecticut 
( 1966), in which a marital right 
to privacy in r eproducti ve matters 
was decla red to be protected as a 
constitutional right and its culmi-
nation can be seen in the recent 
decl aration by the Supreme Court 
tha t " this right of privacy . . . is 
broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not 
to te rminate her pregnancy."1 
Current concern for the effects 
of rapid populatio n growth and 
the scarcity of resources has con-
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tributed to a second trend whic 
influences this discussion : a move 
ment toward a "quality of life 
ethic which, accord ing to an ed 
toria l in California Medicin . 
places relative rather than abs< 
lute value on human life .2 Th 
"quality of life" ethic may be sec 
generally in the trend toward a• 
cepting abortion and specifical 
in arguments that it is better n< 
to be born than to be born U ! 
wanted. 
Thus prenatal diagnosis h. 
arisen in a general climate < 
concern for " popula tion growt 
women's rights, the consequenc 
of illegal abortions, the numb 
of 'unwanted ' children and tl 
discriminatory aspects of curre 
abortion laws.":! It · is within tl 
general framework and its speci, ; 
a rticul ation in the recent det -
sio ns by the Supreme Court ti' t 
the practice of prena tal diagno~ s 
and selective abo rtion must c 
assessed. 
Preliminary Observations 
Before considering the moral y 
of selective abortion, some preli •-
ina ry observatio ns are in ord r. 
Prenata l diagnosis itself is n 
information-gathering procedu e. 
C learly, the information general ·d 
can be used in a variety of wa s, 
and not only as the basis for e-
lective abortion. Indeed, prat ,i-
tioners stress the fact that m 1st 
diagnoses reveal a normal fe us 
and hence serve to reassure anxi1 us 
couples4 and on occasion to p e-
vent a scheduled abortion.~ M ··e-
over, a few disorders may be 
treated prenatally or postnatally 
on the basis of a prenatal diagno-
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sis,6 and it is hoped . tha t more 
treatments will be ava ilable in the 
future.' Thus prenatal diagnosis 
is advocated not only to provide 
for selective abortions, but be-
cause it . potentially brings these 
other benefits as well. Nonethe-
less, a cursory examination reveals 
the centrality of se lecti ve abortion 
in the practice of prenatal diagno-
sis, and hence justifies a focus on 
this one issue. 
To begin with, the importance of 
the "reassurance" rationa le can be 
tested by asking first, whether any 
woman could have an amniocente-
sis just to make sure that the fe tu 
she carries is normal, and second, 
whether a woman could get amnio-
centesis if she had no inte ntion of 
having an abortion in the event of 
abnormality. The answer to both 
these questions is " no ." First, not 
all women are considered eligible 
for amniocentesis, but o nly those 
in "high risk" or " moderate risk" 
groups.K Second, even for those 
women in high risk groups, amni-
ocentesis will not be perfo rmed un-
less abortion is at least an option,!' 
and some practitioners would even 
say that the woman must be com-
mitted to an abortion before diag-
nosis will be performed .111 The rea-
son in both cases is simple: the 
r!sks associated with the diagnos-
tiC procedure are considered suf-
ficiently great so as to preclude 
the diagnosis in the absence of 
genuine risk of defect and suffi -
cient benefit - the benefit of 
reassurance alone does not out-
weigh the harms of the proce-
dure.•• No matter how important 
the reassuring function may be 
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in ac tual practice, it does not con-
stitute sufficient justification for 
widescale prenatal diagnosis. 
Similarly, the a rgument that 
prenatal diagnosis " saves lives" 
by preventing abortions a lso de-
pends on the acceptance of selec-
ti ve abortion : the interest here is 
not in saving the lives of all fetuses 
by preventing all abortions, but 
only in saving the lives of normal 
fetuses by prevent ing them from 
being aborted. Thus the entire line 
of reason ing depends on acceptance 
of the abortion of defecti ve fetuses. 
As for treatment, there are cur-
rently only a few disorders for 
which treatments are avail able and 
"at the present time, the emphasis 
is placed on diagnosis of disorders 
in wh ich there is no treatment."l 2 
Moreover, even where treatment 
is available, most practitioners 
still allow the couple the choice 
of abortion, and indeed suggest 
that that is what most parents 
would prefer. 1:3 Hence the avai l-
ability of treatment does not rule 
out abortion . 
Developing Treatments 
But even though treatment is not 
a major possibility now, sure ly 
prenatal diagnosis might be j usti-
fied as a necessary means to gain 
basic information needed in order 
to stimula te the development 
of new treatments . 14 Attracti ve 
though this argument might at 
first seem, however, there are sev-
eral problems here. 
First, if parents would indeed 
choose abortion over "any but 
the most trivia l treatmen t, " • ~ it 
is not clear th at th e impetus to 
deve lop treatments will exist. 
Ill 
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(But even if future fetuses 
might indeed benefit from infor-
mation gained through present 
diagnoses, there remains a serious 
question: is it justifiable to sub-
ject a fetus to risk in an experi-
ment which carries no hope of 
benefit to that fetus but only to 
future fetuses? The lack of clear 
legal and ethical guidelines re-
garding experimentation on the 
unborn must not obscure the fact 
tha t this is a critical question. 
Should the fetus be protected, for 
example, by laws that govern ex-
perimentation on minors? The an-
swer to this question is beyond 
the scope of this essay ; but the 
question must be recognized.) 
Second, whatever hope there 
may be for future treatments, such 
future possibilit ies do not in fact 
form sufficient justification for the 
performance of prenatal diagnosis 
in the eyes of some practitioners. 
Dancis states that any attempt pre-
viously to diagnose defects prior 
to birth would have met with the 
response "why bother?" because 
no intervention was possible. ' " It 
is " medical intervention of some 
sort" that justifies the use o f pre-
natal diagnosis. And, as . we have 
seen, intervention "of some sort" 
usually means abortion. 
It is obvious, then, that what-
ever other benefits may be clai med 
for prenata l diagnosis, for the 
present and for the foreseeable 
future, its "justifying" or " real" 
purpose is to provide for selective 
abortion . Ethically, then, the crux 
of the matter is whether or not 
selective abortion of defective fe-
tuses is justifiable. 
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Selective abo rtion is not, o l 
course, a new issue. While it ha~ 
rarely been a central issue in the 
"abortion debate ," it has received 
at least sporadic attention follow 
ing rubella epidemics and tht 
tha lidomide scare. A "eugenit 
abortion" clause has appeared i1 
almost every proposed model cod, 
for abortion reform, and a nu m 
ber o f states have included sucl 
a c lause in revised abortion statute 
within the last few years.t7 Hence 
the issue itself is not new. 
What is new in selective ab01 
tion following prenatal diagnos1 
is the certa inty of the diagnosi• 
Previously, a decision for selecti \ 
or "eugenic" abortio n had to c 
based on statistical probability < 
" risk" figures; now, an "actu 
diagnosis" can be made.' K Tht . 
prenatal diagnosis is hailed as 
great advance for " taking the. gar 
ble out" o f pregnancy and gene t ; 
counselingYJ 
The advent o f pren atal diagnm ~ 
the refore focuses the question 
selective abortion in a new at J 
dramatic way : for the first ti n 
the problem of selective abort i n 
arises not because of accident •r 
mishap, but because of the del! •-
erate intervention of medical te< 1-
no logy. For the fi rst time, select e 
abortion is not an occasional a td 
regrettable act, but the plan r ·d 
outcome of delibe rate progra olS 
of medical practice. 
Nonetheless, most of the ethi al 
issues ra ised by prenatal diagno, is 
and se lecti ve abortion are issues 
tha t have been implici t or expltc it 
in the "abortion debate" over the 
i\ l ay. 1973 
past few years. Now th is debate 
has raged so long and hard and 
covered so much territory that one 
is well advised to exercise caution 
when e ntering fhe fray. Moreover, 
the recent decisions by the Supreme 
Court suggest that the wisest course 
might be to assume that the legal 
resolution of the issue also resolves 
the moral dilemmas. 
Arguments Examined 
However, I suggest that previous 
debate and present legal frame-
work notwithstanding, there may 
yet be a little room fo r clarifica-
tion of the issues and mora l deci-
sion-making with regard to selective 
abortion . Therefore, I shall exam-
ine the a rguments offered as j usti-
fication for selecti ve abortion and 
place those arguments within a 
logical framework which will he lp 
to ascertain what is rea lly at stake 
in this practice. 
The matter is co mplicated at th e 
outset by the fact that few prac-
titioners present explicit a rguments 
to justify selective abortion. Most 
advocates si mply refer to the le-
gality of abortion or its acceptance 
within a significant reference group 
-:- for example, " therapeutic abor-
tion may be offered where it is 
legal,"20 "most people would prob-
ably prefer abortion,"2 t " most ob-
stetricians would regard abortion 
as acceptable,"22 and so on. In-
deed, some practitioners specifica lly 
e~~mpt themselves from responsi-
b_thty for making the ethical deci-
Sion, on grounds that it is their 
j?b to lay the empirica l founda-
tions on which legal, ethica l, and 
politica l decisions wi ll be made 
by others. ~ :1 
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onetheless, alongside specific 
disclaimers and vague re ferences 
to decision-making groups there 
emerges from the discussio n a con-
stellatio n of claims for selective 
abortion. 
First, selective abortion is justi-
fied on grounds that it procures 
benefits for individual famili es : 
it protects them from the financia l 
and emotiona l strains associated 
with bearing and rearing a child 
with a genetic disease24 and it 
minimizes the risks involved in 
pregnancy. Special pleas a re made 
on behalf of families with a pre-
vious history of devastating defect, 
who may be afraid to " take a 
chance" with another pregnancy 
unless they can have prenata l 
diagnosis.t.> 
In addition, there is considerable 
emph asis on the rights of women 
and couples and especia lly on 
freedom of choice and autono my 
in the reproductive sphere . Amni-
ocentesis is seen as a technique 
which "opens doors"- that is, 
which expands the o ptions avail-
able to women and the ir spouses, 
thus enabl ing them to exercise 
freedom of choice.21; It is a cardi-
nal rule in the practice of prenata l 
diagnosis that the " ultimate" deci-
sion for both di agnosis and abor-
tion is to be made by the coupleP 
One practitioner has even sug-
gested that parents have a right 
to healthy children.tK 
First Rationale 
T hus the fi rst rationa le given 
for selecti ve abortion . is that of the 
benefits accruing to indi vidual wom-
en and their fam ilies. As this ra-
tiona le begins to shade over into 
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questions of women's rights and 
reproductive freedom, it takes o n 
the cha racte r of the first social 
trend enumera ted above, ass imi-
lating the trend and contributing 
to it. 
Alo ngside th is concern for the 
pregnant woman and her fa mily, 
the re em erges another concern : 
an inte rest in the impact of genetic 
disease o n society as a whole, and 
in the public health as pects of pre-
natal diagnosis. Justification for 
diagnosis and abortio n is there-
fore a lso derived from benefits to 
society gained through wide-scale 
screening programs. 
In the first place, genetic ists con-
tend tha t screening programs co uld 
have a eugenic effect in e liminat-
ing de lete rio us genes fro m the 
gene poo 1.<!9 In the second place, 
practitio ne rs argue that screening 
and abortio n would significantly 
reduce fin a ncial burdens to the 
sta te, since fewer children would 
be born needing costly medical o r 
institutio nal care. Elabo rate cost -
benefi t economic analyses have 
been mad e for several disorders .:ICI 
Concern fo r protection of society 
a t la rge is thus the second reason 
given as justifica tio n for selective 
abortio n . 
Just as a rguments regarding 
benefits to women "shaded over" 
into a rguments about women's 
rights and procreative f reedom, 
so he re the a rguments regarding 
benefits to soc iety shade over in to 
a la rge r concern, which may be 
encom passed by the phrase " qual-
ity o f life ." Prenatal diagnosis a nd 
se lective abortion a re justified be-
cause they function to preserve a 
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norm of genetic health which 
a part of the " quality of li fe.":i t 
The concern for a standard o 
gene t ic health may be seen to op 
era te, first, in the assumptio n tha 
prena ta l diagnos is and selectiv 
abo rtion function as " preventiv 
medicine." This assumption ha 
been made explicit on several oc 
casio ns .:12 Moreover, it is implic 
in the use of phrases such as " r( 
duce the incidence of disease, 
"elimina te di sease," or " prever 
the birth o f " rather than '.'abort 
As " preventive medicine," prenat. 
diagnos is a nd selective abortio 
combine to preserve the no rm < 
genetic health which is a pa rt < 
the qua lity of life . 
Second, concern. · fo r the nor 
of genetic health and the quali 
of life have been r a ised explici t 
by sever al advocates. Qua lity · r" 
life questio ns a re most often link( I 
to questions of quantity, and it ~ 
here tha t the conce rn for gene t 
no rmalcy becomes most apparer 
Prenata l diagnos is is seen as 
means o f quality control in J 
quantity-l imited syste m. O n t c 
level of the indi vidual family, t e 
qua ntity-qua lity link is seen cle< ·-
ly in sta tements to the effect t l 1t 
w ith increasing pressure to li n it 
fa mily size, pa rents will not W <.J 1t 
to risk any departure from the l1l r -
mal in the ir offspring.:r:r lnded, 
under pressures of quantity, q u 1-
ity contro l becomes a right : · if 
the s ize of our fa milies must JC 
limited , surely we a re entitled to 
children who a r e healthy rather 
than defective. " :14 
Social Needs 
The quality pro blem is seen not 
Linacre Quarll:rly 
only o n the individua l level, how-
ever, but a lso as a res ponse to so-
cietal needs. Thus one practitio ner 
. claims: " The world no lo nger needs 
all the individuals we a re capable 
of bringing into it," and a rgues 
for selective abortion on these 
grounds. 3s Prenatal diagnosis be -
comes a tool to ensure tha t "both 
the quantity and quality of the 
human race a re kept within rea-
sonable limits.":l6 Maintaining the 
norm of genetic health thus justi-
fies prenata l diagnosis a nd selec-
tive abortion because m aintenance 
of the no rm is a necessary step in 
ensuring quality of life in a time 
of concern for populatio n growth. 
The concern here is well summa-
rized by one practitio ner re flect ing 
on the work of severa l pio neers in 
the fi~ld: 
Dr. Gerbie and his. assoc iates have 
helped us take still a nothe r step 
down the long road which we must 
follow if we are going to improve 
the quality of human existence 
while searching f or better methods 
of controlling populatio n densit y.:l1 
Finally, the norm of g~netic 
health may a lso be seen in the 
argument that the fetus has a right 
to be "well-born. ":lH The argu -
ment here is that there is a funda -
menta l right to be born " with no r -
mal body and mind" and that if 
this right is no t to be fulfill ed , 
then it is better not to be born a t 
a11.:19 
. In sum, the impo rtance of genet-
IC health is taken as a given, which 
carries its own justifica tio n . It is 
~nly necessary to know tha t there 
IS a choice between he alth and dis -
ease: _the obvious choice on the 
part of a ll parties- fa mily, society, 
May, 1973 
and the individual concerned -
will be for health .40 
These, then , a re the j ustifications 
for selective abortion: benefits to 
the woman and fam ily and to so-
ciety as a who le, bo th in terms of 
sp ecific and measurable emotional 
and economic factors and in terms 
of the maintenance or restoratio n 
o f the norm of genetic health. 
Ill 
We can now ask how these justi-
ficat io ns fit into the context of the 
"abortio n debate," what other as-
sumptions are necessary to expli-
cate them, and what it means to 
fo llow out the ir implicatio ns log-
ica lly. 
Severa l of the justifications of-
fered for selective abortio n follow-
ing pre natal diagnosis a re simila r 
to specific a rguments used to es-
tablish other ca tego ries of " indi-
ca tio ns for abortio n. " 
The concern to protect the wom-
a n and fam ily e mo tiona lly and fi-
na nc ia lly is not a new concern 
in the abortio n de bate, nor is it 
unique to se lective (or eugenic) 
a bo rtio n; rather, it is reminiscent 
o f the " psychiatric" and "socio-
econo mic" indications for abor-
tio n . Thus if these a rguments a re 
used to justify se lective abort io n, 
the justi fica tio n becomes simila r 
to tha t used for the psychiatric and 
socio-economic indications. And 
indeed, it appears to be the prac-
tice in some places to requi re a 
psychia tric examinatio n and justi-
fy the abortion as " therapeutic" 
o n these grounds. 4' 
However, some ad vocates reject 
the " psychiatric indications" a r-
gument: one practitioner calls it 
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" circuitous" and " ridiculous" to 
require psychiatric examination 
of the woman following diagnosis 
of defect in the fetus.42 They 
want the presence of defect alone 
to be sufficient justification for 
abortion. This argument, there-
fore, parallels the traditiona l a r-
guments for a separate category 
of " eugenic" abortion which has 
validity independently of other 
criteria. 
The assertion that there should 
be an independent category of 
abortion for "eugenic" indica ti ons, 
in which the very presence of de-
fect justifies abortion, is a logi-
cal outcome of reasoning on the 
basis of a no rm of genetic health. 
Thus a psychiatrist commenting 
on prenatal di agnosis notes that 
" for some people, abortion of a 
defective fetus is less unsavory 
than abortion of a presumably 
no rmal fetus," and he explains this 
fact on the basis that it is " in line 
with our medical orientation that 
makes the extirpation of disease a 
noble act."~ :l 
If arguments for selective abor-
tion appear at first glance to coin-
cide with various arguments for 
" indications" for abortion, how-
ever, there is also evide nce of 
affinities between arguments used 
for selective abortion and the so-
ca lled " abortion on demand" a rgu-
ments.44 Here, the basic cla im 
is that the woman's freedom is 
an overriding value which dictates 
the availability of abortion " with-
out reason" (that is, without public 
or legislative consensus on the 
reason proffered) . Women may 
thus choose to have a c hild or 
116 
not, to have a defective child 
not, as they please. 
C learly, then, it is necessary 
examine the arguments for sell 
tive abortio n both within the ge 
eral context of "abortion on c · 
mand" and within the more speci ~ 
context of specia l claims made 
the case of defect. It will also ~ 
necessary to suggest ways in whi '1 
the recent Supreme Court d ecis i :1 
impinges on the various argume. s 
and sets the context for any futt e 
action . 
IV 
I shall begin by examining Vt y 
briefly the question of " abort i n 
on demand ." (Before do ing ), 
however , a brief note is necess: ·y 
regarding the relation of abort: n 
on d e mand to the more speciali, ·d 
arguments for abortion in selec ·d 
categories. The history of the ab r· 
tion controversy makes it o bvi< JS 
that it is possible to argue for e-
lected categories of justifiable ab •r· 
tion without a lso condoning ab r· 
tion on demand . I would ar, Je 
that it is also logically possi blc to 
condone abortion on demand w h-
out necessarily condoning eugc tic 
abortion . Logically, one can ar uc 
that a woman has the right to le· 
termine whether or not she is 1 re· 
pared to accept a pregna ncy, mt 
that having made that determr 1a· 
tion the particular status of ,he 
fetus sho uld be irrelevant.) 
T he a bortio n on demand ar gu· 
ment gives primacy to the freecom 
of choice of the woman. Howe ' er, 
it must a lso deal with the fact ,hat 
freedom of choice of one hu man 
being does not usually extend to 
the point of killing another hu nwn 
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being; that is, there is · a presump-
tion that a human being has a 
right to life and that my freedom 
does not normally extend to the 
point where it de prives another 
of his right to li fe . Thus if the 
fetus is considered to be a human 
being, the woman would not nor-
mally have the right to kill that 
human being. T o counter this dif-
ficulty, advocates of abortion on 
demand usually take either of 
two positions: First, they argue 
that the fetus is not a human be-
ing - or not " fully" human -
and hence has no right to li fe. 
Second, they a rgue that although 
the fetus is human a nd hence has 
a right to life, there is something 
in the unique relationship of the 
WQman and fetus that destroys the 
"normal" prohibition against ki ll-
ing. 
Most advocates have taken the 
first approach: they assert that the 
fetus is not (fully) huma n. A rgu-
ments of this sort range from those 
that assert that the fetus is a me re 
"tissue" or part of the woma n's 
body45 to those that recognize 
the fetus as a " develo ping" or 
"potential" human being, but 
argue that full humanity is not 
present until a specified time. 
Must Set Time 
The difficulty with this view is 
that advocates must then deter-
mine a time at which the develop-
ing embryo/fetus/neonate is con-
sidered to be (fully) human - six 
weeks? three months? at viability? 
one year after birth? That is, they 
are caught in a line-drawing pro b-
lem: When does the individual ac-
quire full human sta tus? The desig-
May, 1973 
nation of a time of attainment of 
full humanity a lways presupposes 
the c hoice of criteria accord ing to 
which huma nity is determined -
brain function ? lung capacity? 
personality? speech? 
Now these criteria for determin-
ing that one has reached full hu-
manity always have to do with func-
tional capacity and personal devel-
opment. Hence it is always possi ble 
to ask whether there would be 
others besides fetuses who would, 
logica lly speak ing, be subject to 
the determination that they are not 
" fully human" and hence not pro-
tectab le under the law. 
For example, geneticist J oshua 
Lederberg argues that the moment 
of conceptio n should not be con-
sidered " as the start of human life"; 
rather, he suggests, " an operation-
a lly useful point of divergence o f 
the developing organism would 
be a t approxima tely the first year 
of life, " ·W on the basis of develo p-
ment of la nguage and cognitive 
interaction with others. However, 
the establishment of this time point 
on these criteria would obviously 
allow for the destruction of the 
newborn c hild up to one year of 
age . Logically speak ing, Leder-
berg's criteri a would allow for 
infa nticide. At this poi nt, Leder-
berg draws back from accepting 
the logical conclusions of his 
sta ndards and refuses to discuss 
infanticide, on grounds that our 
emotio na l involvement with in-
fants is sufficient to establi sh "a 
pragma tica lly useful dividing line." 
He then implies that the " tastes" 
or emotio na l involvement of " the 
majority" determines one's status 
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as a human being to be given full 
protection under the law: "To dis-
cuss the fetus during prenata l life 
as if he were a human be ing is · 
merely to reflect the emotional 
invo lvement of that observer, ac-
cording to a set of tastes not now 
shared by the majority." One must 
ask, then, whether persons or 
groups who do not meet the stan-
dard of emotional involvemen t 
would be considered less than 
fully human and not protectable 
- for example, the convicted crim-
inal or any outcast group:17 Once 
again, Lederberg draws back from 
the logical conclusions of his own 
argument and suggests that the 
criterion of emotional involvement 
"should not be confused with any 
objective biological standard by 
which we can set up principles of 
socia l order." 
Lederberg's search for an "ob-
jective biological s tandard" to get 
him out of the problems he en-
counters with his own criteria il-
lustrates as well as anything the 
inherent difficulty in this basic 
line of approach: any biological 
point that is chosen \': ill be chosen 
on the basis of other crite ria, and 
these c riteria . are a ll too o ften the 
results of our very human weak-
nesses. (Do we choose uspontane-
ous lung function" as the dete r-
mining criterion of humanness be-
cause we really think it is a deci-
s ive criterion, or rather because 
we would like to be able to de-
stroy the fetus prior to viability?) 
Are we willing to accept the con-
sequences of our ·choices - what 
about those who must exist with 
the help of an iron lung? 
11 8 
Human Standards 
In short, there is no "objecti 
biologica l standard," but only ve ' 
rea l human standards. To be su 
some choices make more ser 
than others: Fletcher has suggest~ 
for exa mple, that in order to ~ 
consistent with ou r increasing 
entation toward bra in activity 
defining the end of human li 
we should also define the beg 
ning of human life in terms ,f 
bra in activi ty.48 Certa inly, ·· c< ~ ~ 
sistency is a desirable trait in b< h 
logical thinking and huml\n int 
action ; indeed, this suggest n 
f!1akes considerable sense. Hl :-
ever, s ince the presence of br n 
activity in the fetus has been m 1-
sured as earl y as six weeks, c· 1-
siderably before amniocentesis ' ,n 
be performed, F letcher 's criter m 
would preclude prenata l diagn1 is 
and selective abortio n. 
In view of the difficulties J f 
drawing a line on the devcl p-
mental continuum, several ad a-
cates of abortion on demand h ve 
preferred to take the second ro ,e: 
they argue for abortion o n he 
basis of the special relatiom tip 
between the woman and the f us 
which is deemed to nulli fy .he 
prohibition against killing. he 
most intriguing expos it ion of an 
a rgument alo ng thi s line is t ha of 
Judith J arvis Thomson.4!1 
Thomson proposes that we ac-
cept, for the sake of argun ; nt, 
the claim that the fetus is hum<••l .:,u 
T he question then is, under ' hat 
circumstances may we justi fLtbly 
kill a human being? Suppose, -,ays 
Thomson, that you wake one m Jrn-
ing strapped to a famous un..:on-
scious violinist who needs your 
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kidneys to survive; " Is it morally 
incumbent on you to accede to 
this situation? Does the right to 
. life of the violinist require this 
heroic a n<;! self-sacrificing act on 
the part of another person? T hom-
son concludes that · it does not: 
" nobody is morally required to 
make large sacrifices, o f health, 
of all other interests and concerns, 
of all other duties and commit-
ments, for nine years, or even for 
nine months, in order to keep an-
other person a li ve." In essence, 
Thomson's argument rests upon 
the mora l right of the woman to 
remove herself from the violinist 
-or from the fetus. While sepa-
rating woman and fetus in fa.ct 
secures the death of the fetus, 
Thomson is not arguing that a 
woman has a right to secure the 
death of the fetus, but only to 
remove herself. Presumably, if 
pre-natal adoption or an artificial 
womb were available, e ither of 
the options could be used to pre-
serve the fetus while freeing the 
woman. 
This a rgument is more than in-
triguing; it has a certa in force in 
its logic. Nonetheless, I think it 
also admits of some difficulties. 
Thomson claims tha t the woman 
has a right to remove herself from 
the fetus; the fact that the fe tus 
then dies is perhaps unfortunate, 
but not central to the mora l issue. 
Perhaps a different scena rio will 
help elucidate the issues. 
If one grants, as T homson does 
th ' 
. at the fetus is human, then the 
~ssue is whether one human be-
Ing may remove herself from an-
other when that other is depend-
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ent upon her body functions for 
survival. Surely the closest parallel 
to pregnancy, then, is the case of 
s iamese twins, in which separation 
would cause the death of one twin. 
The moral question then is : could 
an adult siamese twin choose to 
" remove" herself from her twin, 
knowing full well that the twin 
would die, but claiming that her 
freedom was the more important 
value? (The medical practice of 
involuntar ily separating siamese 
twins at birth, with the resultant 
death of one, does not change the 
moral argument regarding the 
rights of adult siamese twins.) If 
anything, it could be argued that 
we should fee l more sympathy 
toward the plight of the siamese 
twin than toward the pregnant 
woman - the twin 's predicamen t 
is both involunta ry and lifelong. 
Yet I wonder if we would be wi ll-
ing to accept the twin's argument; 
would we not be inclined to con-
sider the " removal" of one adult 
twin with the resultant death o f 
the other to be murder, or wrong-
ful killing? It is not clear to me 
that we are ready to argue logi-
cally that one human being may 
"remove" himself from another 
when that removal causes the 
other's death. 
Other Examples 
Indeed, to bring the scenario a 
little "closer to home" for most 
of us, let us suppose that a man 
is responsible for the continued 
care o f his e lde rly and dependent 
father, who will die if no one is 
in attendance at his bedside. Sure-
ly this man is morally free to leave 
his father 's bed side i.f there is 
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someone else t o sit and watch over 
his father. But what if there is no 
one else? Is he then morally free 
to walk off, leaving his father to 
die? O r, suppose a young child 
needs medication every few hours 
to survive; is not that child's mother 
mora lly (and perha ps legally) cul-
pable if she " removes" herself from 
the child and it dies? 
In short , Thomso n's distinction 
between removing oneself fro m 
a nother and securing the death of 
another becomes problematic when 
we consider a variety of cases. In 
cases where our nurturing func-
tion could be served by others, we 
are perhaps willing to argue that 
we have a right to re move our-
selves provided that we have se-
cured someone else to carry on 
the nurturing. But in cases where 
there is no one else to carry on 
tha t function - i.e., in pregnancy 
today, and in the case of sia mese 
twins - I suggest that a view that 
reall y respects the full humanity 
of the other wi ll not so readily 
a llow us to argue tha t we may 
" re move ourselves," causing there-
by the death of the othe r. (Hence, 
I suspect that Tho mson .has not 
really ta ken the human status of 
the fetus seriously, that she has 
not really overcome her own pre-
disposi tion " that the fetus is not 
a person fro m the moment of 
conceptio n.") 
To accept Thomson's argument 
mea ns to accept what it logically 
enta ils: the right of any human be-
ing to remove himself from one 
who is dependent on him, even if 
that removal results in the o ther's 
d eath - the elde rl y father , the 
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child in need of medicatio n, an 
the adult siamese . twin. Once agai1 
the argument allows for the de 
structio n of othe r human being• 
If we are not willing to acceJ 
these consequences, the n we mu· 
reject the premises. 
v 
Thus far, I have dealt with tl 
general question of abortion u1 
der the rubric "abortion on de 
mand," locating two basic wa. 
of approaching this issue and su 
gesting that there are probl~ms 
the extens ion of logic in either 
these approaches. It has not be• 1 
my intention to resolve the iss 
of whether or not the fetus is c 
titled to protection of its li fe, t 
only to illustrate the difficul ll ' 
encountered in a position that c 
nies protection to the fetus. 
However , the question of seh 
tive a bortion introduces a new c 
ment to the discussion . As Dan ·I 
Calla han suggests, with select1 e 
abortion we are dealing not w h 
the proble m of an unwanted pn ?-
nancy, but with the problem of n 
unwa nted ch ild:'' A logical e x r-
cise will illustrate what is at sta c: 
Suppose that an art ificial wo tb 
were avai I able. Then , if the p r-
pose of abortion is to free 1e 
woman from an unwanted pr g-
nancy, logically the fetus would be 
placed in the artificial womb. Wo dd 
a defective fetus also be thus r ·e-
served, o r would its gene tic st<..tUS 
somehow " make a diffe rence" in 
how it is treated? 
Since the purpose of seleCti ve 
abortion is not only to pro tect the 
woma n but also to protect soc1dY 
and preserve the 11orm of ge ndic 
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health, it seems logical to assume 
that simply moving the fetus from 
one location to another wou ld not 
·be sufficient to fulfi ll the purposes 
of selective a bortion. To the ex-
tent that selective abortion is ori~ 
ented toward ma intenance of the 
norm of genetic health or the 
"quality of life," it requires the 
destruction of those who do not 
meet this norm. 
Now this illustration of the ar-
tificial womb is , of course, a hypo-
thetical situation a t ·present. None-
theless, there are indications in the 
current practice that demonstrate 
the centrality of destructio n of de-
fective fetuses in this practice. 
Determining Sex 
First, prenatal diagnosis is used 
to determine the sex of the fetus 
in cases at risk for sex-linked dis-
orders such as hemophilia. In 
such cases, the male fetus which 
is aborted has a 50 percent ch ance 
of being normal. Thus half of the 
fetuses which are aborted in sex-
linked cases will in fact be normal; 
this destruction of norma l fetuses 
is allowed in order to e nsure de-
struction of defecti ve fetuses . 
Now in the case of sex-linked 
disorders, one does not know wheth-
er a particular fe tus is de fecti ve or 
normal ; hence the abortio n is done 
on the supposition that the fetus 
might be defective. A more com-
plicated case, therefore, would be 
that of a diagnosis of twins wh ich 
revealed one normal twin and one 
defective twin. In such a case, in 
order to " get rid of" the defective 
fetus, it would be necessary to de-
stroy . the normal fetus as well. 
Would this destruction of normal 
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fetuses be allowed? To date, pre-
natal diagnosis has missed the 
presence of twins, but practition-
ers agree that parents would be 
allowed the choice.52 Thus even 
a known normal fe tus could be 
aborted in order to abort an ab-
norma l fe tus. 
Fina lly, since there is a lways a 
possibility of error in diagnosis, 
we can ask whether advocates pre-
fer a false positive which would 
result in the abortion of a normal 
fe tus, or a false negative which 
wou ld result in the birth of a n 
affected child. Practitioners dis-
agree here. One states flatl y tha t 
the loss of the "rare normal preg-
nancy" would be "an undefenda-
ble catastrophe." 53 Another, how-
ever, suggests that it is a " more 
critica l" error if a negative diag-
nosis is given and the ch ild is 
born defective than if a positive 
diagnosis results in abortion of a 
presumed defective fetus and the 
defect is not confirmed upon ex-
amination of the abortus.5-t 
It seems clear that the practice 
of prenatal diagnosis establishes 
a distinction between the normal 
and the defective fetus, and al-
lows for differential treatment of 
the fe tus on th is basis. As one 
concerned practitioner put it: "We 
are faced with problems of assign-
ing va lues to individuals with given 
genetic characteristics and design-
ing programs directed against 
them."~.; 
Serious Problems 
What a re the implications o f 
adopting this kind of reasoning 
-of treating fetu ses diffe rentia l-
ly according to their gene tic con-
1::?.1 
stitution? I suggest that there are 
a number of serious problems in 
establishing this kind of precedent, 
and I shall deal briefly with several 
of these, illustrating where appro-
priate with difficulties encountered 
already in the practice of prenata l 
diagnosis. 56 
The first problem is th at of de-
termining the categories of fetuses 
considered destructible. Where is 
the line to be drawn on the deter-
mination of what constitutes suffi-
cient " quality of life" to enable 
the fetus to live? 
This problem will be encoun-
tered in two forms. In the first 
form, it has to do with the severity 
of genetic defect. The normative 
use of prenatal diagnosis is for 
severe, untreatable disorders (e.g., 
Tay-Sachs, Down's syndrome). 
However, even present techniques 
will diagnose less severe disorders 
(e.g., XO), and with expanding 
technology such incidents may be 
anticipated more frequently. Will 
abortion be allowed for less se-
vere genetic disorders, or for dis-
orders where treatment is avail-
able? 
Already this problem is being en-
countered in · the practice of pre-
natal diagnosis, a nd advocates ap-
pear to be divided in their responses. 
While some would maintain that 
" if there is an effective intra-
uterine treatment, then, of course, 
it should be applied,"57 probably 
most would agree that abortion in 
the case of a treatable disorder 
" remains a parental decision based 
on the informed counse l of their 
physician. "5K 
Second, the determina tion of 
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destructible fetuses may be e 
tended from clear genetic cat 
gories to categories of social d 
sirability or usefulness. As Ka 
says, "Once the principle, 'Defe 
tives should not be born,' is e 
tablished, grounds other than cyt 
logical and biochemical may ve 
well be sought."59 The beginnin 
of this trend may already be se 1 
in the treatment of fetuses wi 1 
XYY chromosomes, where· t 
" prognosis" for the child is pr 
Iematic primarily because- of t 
possibility of socia lly undesiral 
behavior. If XYY fetuses are 
be aborted, then what about fetw s 
of women living in undesirab le c 
cumsta nces - for example, wo 
en on welfare? Will "quality ~ f 
life" come to be determined m< e 
on the basis of socia l usefuln s 
than clear genetic disorder? C e 
practitiOner has a lready ~rgt d 
for prenatal diagnosis on groUJ Is 
that " the world no longer ne• Is 
a ll the individuals we a re capa le 
of bringing into it - especi : ly 
those who are unable to camp te 
and an unhappy burden to < h-
ers."60 Surely such criteria as 
"ability to compete" extend '1e 
range of destructible fetuses ar 
beyond the severe ly genetic lly 
handica pped . 
Indeed, I would stress the tct 
tha t all categories chosen dep nd 
on some social criteria - e en 
those that are most closely 11ed 
to genetic anomaly. For exam.1le, 
most practitioners consider Dov n's 
syndrome to be a "clear-cut" case 
calling for abortio n.H1 Certa111 ly 
the genetic compo nent -a trisomy 
G - is clear enough ; and this 
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genetic component is re lated to 
certain clinical symptoms such as 
mental retardation. But to deter-
mine therefore that fetuses with 
trisomy G . should be aborted is to 
make a social judgment about the 
place of retarded individuals in 
society. It is possible to judge dis-
ability or deviation from a norm 
medically, but to determine that 
this deviation constitutes a signif-
icant handicap is to make a socia l 
judgment. H2 
Drawing a Line 
The first point, then, is th at it 
is extremely difficult to "draw a 
line" ·with regard to the categories 
of fetuses which will be consid-
ered destructible, since all deter-
mination of such categories in-
cludes a social component and 
will be subject to the vagaries of 
~oci al opinion. The phrase "qual-
Ity of life" defines a continuum 
from the severely disabled through 
the socially undesirable to the 
"optimal" child. Where on this 
continuum will the line be drawn? 
The second " line drawing" prob-
lem has to do with the time contin-
uum. As one practitioner asks: 
"Are we going to be faced with 
d~mands to do away with a child 
With 2 1-trisomy whose mother was 
only 34 years old during her preg-
nancy and therefore was denied 
t~e benefits of prenatal di agno-
s ?1"3 IS. I Do not the same arguments 
that justify abortion of a fi ve month 
old fetus a lso justify infanticide? 
That this question is not J·ust 
r ·f anc•. ~I is borne out by a recently 
pubh~Ized case at Johns Hopkins 
Hospita l in which a newborn child 
with Down's syndrome was report-
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edly starved to death because its 
parents refused surgery necessary 
to save its life.H4 It seemed clear 
tha t had the child been normal, 
the surgery would have been per-
formed. 
Indeed, some physicians now 
argue explicitly for a different 
standard of treatment for new-
born children with Down's syn-
drome. One has said : "Parents of 
mongoloids have the legal (and I 
believe the moral) responsibility 
of determining if their child . 
should live or die, " and he sug-
gests that this decision may be 
seen as a "second chance" for 
abortion.1;5 
Thus it seems that infanticide 
is si mply the logical extension of 
prenatal diagnosis. Indeed, one 
practitiOner comments: "Early 
abortion based on prenatal diag-
nosis can be viewed as the mod-
ern counterpart o f infanticide based 
on congenita l defect. "H6 This, then, 
is the second serious problem im-
plicit in the reasoning behind pre-
natal diagnosis a nd selecti ve abor-
tion. 
These firs t two pro blems have 
been line-drawing problems-
problems of determining the cate-
gories of destructible fetuses, and 
the time of destructi on. The third 
problem is of a somewhat differ-
ent nature. It involves the locus 
of decision-making and the possible 
conflict between ''women's rights" 
on the one hand and the "quality 
of li fe" on the other. I suggest that 
as increasing value is assigned to 
the " preventi ve" function of pre-
natal diagnosis and selective abor-
tion, the concern to eliminate de-
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fectives and preserve the "quality 
of life" may logically be extended 
to deprive women and families of 
decision-maki ng power. 
Quality of Life 
To be sure, at present advocates 
assume that the concept of "quality 
of life" embraces both the familial 
and the social aspects of prenatal 
diagnosis, and that there will be a 
concurrence of benefits to individ-
ua ls and to society. They assume 
that if women are given freedom 
of choice, they will choose to abort 
defective fetuses and hence their 
choices will serve the best inter-
ests of society as well. 
However, it is obvious that the 
interests of individual families and 
of society at large will not always 
coincide - even in the decision 
to abort the defective fetus. For 
example, it has been calculated 
that if all male fetuses at risk for 
hemophilia were aborted and 
" replaced" by female children, 
the result would be a dramatic 
increase in the number of female 
carriers of hemophi lia - a 50 
percent increase in the gene fre-
quency in each generationY7 Hence, 
decis ions made to benefit individ-
ual fa milies ·might have a dysgenic 
effect on society as a whole. 
On the other hand, at times 
where it would be beneficial finan-
cially to society for a fetus to be 
aborted , the woman or family 
might prefer not to abort. Would 
the woman's freedom of choice 
be restricted . here o n grounds of 
benefiting society or preserving 
the genetic health? One concerned 
practitione r has raised the prob-
lem by suggesting that the unce r-
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tainties 
could result in an accentuation of 
the conflict in our society between 
personal choice and governmental 
control, which could possibly come 
in the form of selected programs of 
compulsory screening and manda-
tory abortion for some conditions 
that are deemed socially lntolera-
ble.68 
Indeed, compulsory abortion has 
ready been proposed. t>9 
In a s ituation where the . fe s 
has no inherent rights and gene c 
health becomes an overriding ' 1-
ue , compulsory amniocentesis < d 
abortion is a logical outcome, ts 
one practitioner rightly antici pa s: 
The decision to terminate the li f 
of a fetus has traditionally bee 
denied even to the couple at r is~ 
but the more widespread legal at 
ceptance of aboriio n, the growin 
awareness of the impending cris 
inherent in the population expl ( 
sion, and increased concern for tt 
social cost of genetic disease lea 
me to think that attempts to ·legi 
late eugenic progra ms may not 1 
so untimely or even so far in tl 
future as many of us have expecte 
Individua ls in a society which 
willing to allow even normal fetus • 
to be aborted simply at the requ( t 
of the parents are not likely to : 
very tolerant of a known abnorrr I 
fetus.'0 
To be sure, several practitic tcrs 
have expressed their alarm an. re-
jection of compulsory prog ams 
a t the same time as they rais the 
questio n. But the point is tha the 
movement toward compu sory 
abortion of defecti ve fetuses is a 
logical outcome of . e levating the 
norm of genetic health to ewer-
ride any rights of the fetus. 
Further, once a principle ha!> been 
established that the genetically un-
equal may be treated unequally in 
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accordance with the ir genetic po-
tential, other forms of unequal 
treatment will be encompassed by 
this principle. One of the first a reas 
to be affected by the application 
of this principle will be that of 
procreation: the suggestion has 
already been made that reproduc-
tion be regulated in accordance with 
genetic inheritance - that " qu ality 
control" have a built-in "qua lity 
control" component.71 A practi-
tioner has even claimed that " most 
of the women screened should not 
have been pregnant in the first 
place. All women who would have 
genetically high-risk pregnancies 
should be offered steriliza tion or 
an effective method of contracep-
tion.72 Thus the way is opened 
up. for other kinds of restrictive 
programs as we ll. 
Impact on Medicine 
Finally, the acceptance of selec-
tive abortion and its principle of 
unequal treatment of unequa ls will 
have profound implications for the 
practice of med icine . On the one 
hand, if selective abortion is a wom-
an's right, then the physician is 
obligated to provide for it _73 As 
with "abortion on demand," the 
role of the physician is thus radi-
cally changed: " For the first time 
· · · doctors will be expected to 
do _an operation simply because the 
patient asks that it be done. "74 The 
physician, then, becomes a tech-
nici_an performing according to the 
destres of others. 
_There is evidence already that 
this dilemma is being encountered 
in the practice of prenatal diagno-
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sis, and tha t many practitioners are 
relucta nt to give up entirely their 
traditio nal decisio n-making func-
tion. Thus, for example, one suggests 
that a mniocentesis should not be 
done in cases of LSD ingestion 
because the physician would be 
obligated to provide for an abor-
tion if chromosome breaks are 
found ;75 here, the physician re-
tains his power of making a med-
ical judgment. Another practitio n-
er has suggested that the use o f 
prenatal diagnosis simply to de ter-
mine the sex of the fetus constitutes 
an "abuse" of prenata l diagnosis 
and that information on the sex 
of the fetus should be withheld 
" unless it is crucial for manage-
ment of the case."76 Prenatal diag-
nosis, in this view, is not to be 
a tool for the "frivolous" uses of 
women ; yet if abortion is a wom-
an's r ight, then it must be per-
formed no matter how "cold-
blooded and contrived" it seems 
to the physician. 
On the other hand, if selective 
abortion is justified not as a wom-
an's right but as a means of main-
taining the norm of genetic health 
and pro moting "quality of life," 
the physician is in danger of be-
coming a technician for society. 
Theologian Helmut Thielicke de-
cla res that the doctor becomes an 
"engineer, a technici an doing 
manipulations for a productive 
society . " 77 Thus Friedmann sug-
gests that " it is not difficult to 
imagine the emergence of pressures 
to set sta ndards for desirability in 
genetica lly determined human char-
acteristics" and we must ask whose 
standa rds they might be. 71! 
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Thus in the long run, this prac-
tice threatens the basic orientation 
of medicine: as geneticist Jerome 
Lejeune puts it, to "capitulate in the 
face of our ignorance and propose 
to eliminate those we cannot help" 
is to reverse the entire course of 
medicine. Not only do the princi-
ples established here have serious 
imp lications for human rights in 
society, but they also challenge the 
foundations of medical practice. 
VI 
Now clearly, many of these same 
problems have arisen in the general 
debate on abortion, and are not 
unique to selective abortion. In a 
sense, one could say that selective 
abortion gives a prismatic view 
of the implications of abortion in 
general - of the problems of ex-
tension of logic, the threats to hu-
man rights and to medical practice. 
Both a bortion in general and selec-
tive abortion in particular involve 
the assignment of relative rather 
than absoiute value to human life 
on the basis of some social criteria; 
hence both establish precedents 
which violate fundamental princi-
p.les of justice as we have under-
stood those principles .in Western 
society. 
Nonetheless, if the basic logic 
of selective abortion does not dif-
fer from that of abortion in general, 
it is focused and reinforced here in 
a way which makes its implications 
more striking and perhaps more 
threaten ing. As Kass suggests, pre-
cisely because the quality of the 
fetus is at stake in the decision for 
selective abortion, this decision 
undermines the fundamental moral 
equality of all human beings.79 
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Further, the practice of prena d 
diagnosis adds something to t 1S 
equation: the deliberate institut n 
of medical programs designed o 
foster selective treatment of hun n 
li fe. Friedmann captures the tr h 
well in his haunting statement t 1t 
Prenatal genetic diagnosis seeme< 
at first no different fro m most othe 
new diagnostic methods. Now w• 
see that we are faced with prob 
lems of assigning values to individ 
ua ls a nd designing programs d1 
rected against them. so 
For all these reasons, I sul 1it 
that the current practice of pren .al 
diagnosis and selective abor n 
threatens basic human rights nd 
I urge practitioners to recons ler 
the implementation of wide-s ale 
programs of diagnosis and abor1 >n. 
Prenatal diagnosis is indeed a ~ry 
exciting new technology with n my 
potentially beneficial uses in ro-
viding "therapy" for the aff\ t ted 
fetus and help to anxious par .1ts. 
These justifiable uses should not 
be overshadowed by allowi n it 
to become strictly an exercis in 
selective abortion . 
Violate Equality 
Even more tha n abortion 0 1 de-
mand, it seems to me, selc tive 
abortion embodies principle of 
unequal treatment which vi Jlate 
the fundamental moral and ega! 
equality of all human being . In 
the long run, this violation of fun-
damental rights · of equal treatment 
is a more serious threat to the ' \ :tual-
ity of life" of all of us than the 
birth of numerous children with 
defects will ever be. I am heart-
ened by the seriousness with which 
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this matter has been taken i'n gen-
eral both by parents and by physi-
cians; nonetheless, it is a danger-
ous move to aid parents by elimi-
nating their· children. We must be-
ware of the implications of moving 
to a "quality of life" ethic in which 
persons are judged according to 
their social utility and hence "some 
are more equal than others." 
But perhaps it will be objected 
that in view of the recent Supreme 
Court decisions on abortion, physi-
cians really have no choice: Does 
not the woman now have a right 
to an abortion, and if so, does the 
medical practtttoner have any 
choice but to offer prenatal di ag-
nosis and selective abortion? 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's 
decisions are ambiguous. The Court 
declares that the " right of privacy" 
established in the Constitution is 
"broad enough to encompass a wom-
an's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy."Bt At 
the same time, however, the Court 
also maintains that " the abortion 
decision" is "inherently, and pri-
marily, a medical decision," and 
at all points it appears to give the 
decision-making power to the 
physician: "The abortion decision 
and its effectuation must be left to 
the medical judgment of the preg-
nant woman's attending physician. " 82 
Thus it is not clear that physicians 
must comply with the demands of 
the woman; there appears to be 
room for " medical judgment" in all 
cases, and especially in cases in-
volving late abortion. Minimally, 
physicians can choose to make a 
true "medical judgment" regarding 
the woman's "life and health" in 
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each case, and not simply to allow 
the very presence of defect to be 
considered sufficient justification 
for abortion without further con-
sideration of the "full setting of the 
case."83 
Finally, it seems to me that all 
of us, physicians and lay persons 
alike, have a responsibility to wom-
en and families to provide the emo-
tional and financial support needed 
to enable families to care for chil-
dren born with defects; although 
I discourage widescale prenatal 
diagnosis and selective abortion 
because of the serious threats to 
basic freedoms involved in this 
practice, I do not think the matter 
is settled morally by rejecting abor-
tion. The birth of a child with a 
defect can indeed be a shatter-
ing experience for a family; it is 
the responsibility of all of us to 
ensure that families are provided 
with adequate resources. Ironically, 
as I write this, federal funds for 
many supportive programs are be-
ing curtailed ; this we must not al-
low to happen. 
If indeed the strength of a people 
can be measured by their attitude 
toward the weak, the defenseless, 
and the outcast, then selective abor-
tion points to the weaknesses in our 
society and in ourselves. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to close with 
a word of warning offered by Ralph 
Potter: 
When a fetus is aborted no one asks 
for whom the bell tolls. No bell is 
tolled. But do not feel indifferent 
a nd secure. The fetus symbolizes 
you and me and our tenuous hold 
upon a future here at the mercy of 
our fellow men.84 
(References available on request.) 
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